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ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE PARTIES DISPUTED THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD EITHER A
MARITAL OR INDIVIDUAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES. THE
PARTIES RESOLVED THAT DISPUTE BY WAY OF STIPULATION. THE TERMS
OF WHICH WERE THAT IF IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DEFENDANT DID
HAVE AN INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTIES, THAT INTEREST WOULD BE
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF.

In Point 1 of the Brief of Appellant, the defendant argues that the finding of the lower
court that the Decree of Divorce awarded the two subject parcels of property to the plaintiff is
clearly erroneous. On July 2, 1991, the date originally set for the trial in the divorce action of
this matter, the parties reached a stipulation. The portion of the stipulation regarding the two
pieces of real property was first recited into the record by defendant's counsel. That portion of
the stipulation is as follows:
There was some other property which, of course, the defendant has claimed
as not marital property. It is our agreement that if it should be determined that
there is a marital interest in the property other than the 10.7 acres and the
residential property that it would go completely to the plaintiff free and clear of
any interest of the defendant. (Transcript of 7/2/91, p. 2, 11. 24, 25; p. 3, 11. 1-5).
Plaintiffs counsel added the following to the stipulation:
There are in our view, Judge, two pieces of real property and I want to be
clear on this one point, two pieces of property in addition to the 10.7 acres in
North Salt Lake and the marital residence, which my client claims there is an
interest either in himself, the two of them, or in the defendant by herself, and it's
the agreement between the parties that whatever interest she may have in reference
to both the individual capacity or as a marital estate, would be conveyed to my
client, if any. (Transcript of 7/2/91, p. 4, 1. 25; p. 5, 11. 1-9) (emphasis added).
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In his brief, the plaintiff argues that the "if any" portion of the stipulation (which are the
last t > - : »,( ords of the por tion of the stipi llation read into the recoi d b> the plaintiff) referred c id)
to the defendant's unwillingness to grant a Quit-Claim Deed rather than a Warranty Deed.
I he stipi llation as i ea :i int :: tl le i ecoi d and as added to and clarified ti; the plaintiff
makes no mention of any npe of deed, '['he stipulation identifies a dispute in referring to iwo
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marital interest in those properties. The defendant stipulates that if it uere determined that there
was a marital interest in those properties, J^H t;^ r;„..i;;n

.-uid :\: en.,u^; .-. .;..;. merest.

The plaintiff set forth an additional torn) of the stipulation

That additional term was that

if the defendant had an ii.vii.uUi.. .^m-maniai mieiesi ii. -i^ -uoject properties, that non-marital
interest would be awards- * to the plaintiff

1 he plaintiff ree'e^ thai "he would receive whatever

interest the deieiiduut luii. whether a K mantaJ w- individual, if an\

emphasis added.) The

words "if any" are consistent with the recitation of the stipulation by the defendant in which the
defendant identifies the position that there was no interest in the subject properties. The first
reference in the stipulation is to the parties' dispute as to whether the defendant had an individual
or marital interest in the properties, The parties resolved their dispute by agreeing that if it were
determined that the defendant had either a marital or indi\ idi lal interest in the properties, then
those properties would be awarded to the plaintiff
The stipulation read intc the i ;xc)i d depri\ es the plaintiff c f the a rgi unent that he does
make in his brief that there was an agreement that the plaintiff was unequivocally awarded the
2

two subject pieces of real property. The stipulation identifies a dispute as to ownership and
interest, and leaves for future determination whether there was in fact a marital and/or individual
in the properties. The resultant Decree of Divorce serves the purpose of effectuating the parties'
stipulation.
On page 14 of his brief, the plaintiff makes numerous references to the settlement
negotiations of July 2, 1991. These paragraphs are devoid of any citation to the record. This
Court stated in Butler Crockett & Wash v Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P. 2d 225 (Utah 1995) that
"this court has repeatedly noted that it will not accept as true factual allegations in briefs not
property cited to the record." Id. at 230. As there are no citations to the record as to these
supposedly factual allegations, the holding of Butler requires that they not be accepted as true.
POINT 2: AS THE PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED THAT THE DEFENDANT DID
NOT KNOW WHAT INTEREST SHE HAD IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
THE FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The second argument of the defendant's brief is that the court's finding that the defendant
had negotiated in bad faith is clearly erroneous. In her brief, the defendant argued that as both
the plaintiff and the defendant consistently testified that the defendant did not participate in any
way in the purchase of the properties; did not participate in any way in the maintenance or
disposition of the properties; in that the defendant did not know what interest she had in the
properties; and as the plaintiff had in fact testified that the defendant did not know what interest
she had in the properties, the defendant could not have negotiated in bad faith.
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In the second section of his brief, the plaintiff contends that as the defendant had
conveyed her interest in the properties to her sister by way of Warranty Deed, she really must
have known what interest she had in the properties. The contention of the second section of the
plaintiffs brief that the defendant knew what interest she had in the properties is to be contrasted
with the contention the plaintiff makes in the first section of his brief. In the first section of his
brief, the plaintiff explains that he wanted the "if any" language in the stipulation because he
knew that the defendant had an interest in the properties, and that the defendant did not know that
she had an interest in the properties. The plaintiff supports this argument with two (2) portions
of his trial testimony. These portions of testimony, which are found on pages 000517 and
000443 of the trial transcript, respectively, set forth the undisputed fact that the defendant did not
know what interest she may have had in the properties. These portions of testimony also set forth
the plaintiffs claim that it was he who kept the defendant unaware of any interest in the
properties.

Although these portions are set forth in the plaintiffs brief, for the sake of

convenience they are set forth here as well.
Q:

Stay focused on the "if any." Do you remember the negotiations, Shauna not
knowing what was there?

A:

Very much so.

Q:

And therefore not willing to commit one way or the other regarding these two
parcels because she didn't know what she had?

A:

Yes, sir.
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Q:

And do you recall if the idea was to protect her because she wasn't giving any
warranties on time?

A:

That's right.

(Trial transcript, p. 000517).
Q:

I want you to focus on my question in reference to the language found in open
court. Do you recall there being a time when Shauna didn't know what was there
and so we phrased it in those terms?

A:

Sure.

Q:

Tell the Court about that quickly, please.

A:

We, you know, she was busy doing other things and she didn't really ~ I know
we didn't keep her really abreast of any of it. We sat her down and said we want
you together on the title. Here's a check. And we gave them a check, and that's
it.

Q:

So Shauna wasn't abreast of things. So when it comes time to negotiate this
parcel and if any interest - "if any," why are we saying "if any" in the stipulation
and the agreement process, Mr. Costanzo?

A:

Because I don't think she knew what she had.

(Trial transcript, p. 000443).
The plaintiff should not be heard so as to argue in one section of his brief that certain
language was included in the stipulation because he knew what interest the defendant had in the
properties, and that he knew the defendant did not know what interest she had in the properties,
and then in the following section seek to argue that the defendant did negotiate in bad faith
because she did know what interest she had in the properties.
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The plaintiffs argument that the defendant must have known what interest she had in real
property because she conveyed a Warranty Deed fails, given the plaintiffs own trial testimony.
In the portion of the plaintiffs testimony set forth above, the plaintiff stated in regards to the
defendant that, "We sat her down and said we want you together on the title. Here's a check.
And we gave them a check, and that's it." (Trial transcript, p. 000443). The above-cited
testimony of the plaintiff is consistent with the evidence (a) that the plaintiff did not know what
interest she had, if any, in the subject properties; (b) that if she did have an interest, it was
acquired from her on behalf of others; (c) that these others had told her that she was on the title;
and (d) that despite being told she was on the title, and in receiving a check, as the plaintiff
insisted the defendant still had no knowledge of any interest in the subject pieces of real property.
It is inconsistent for the plaintiff to describe a pattern of dealing in which the defendant held title
only through the actions of others, and then claim that she had no knowledge in the property, and
then claim that she developed knowledge of an interest in the real properties when she was still
acting on behalf of others in signing a Warranty Deed.
The plaintiff raises the point in his brief that the defendant would have violated the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act of § 25-6-1 Utah Code Ann. The plaintiff does not explain
how the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act would apply to the facts of this case. There are
a number of requirements that must be met in order for a transaction to be fraudulent under the
Act. One of those requirements in insolvency of the debtor. The plaintiff does not contend that
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the defendant was insolvent at the time of the subject transactions, or became insolvent as a result
of the transactions.
The contention that the transactions would have been invalidated by the Utah Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act should not be a topic for consideration in this appeal. As was set
forth above, the plaintiff does not indicate how or why the facts of the instant case fit within the
Act. Additionally, the plaintiff did not argue at the time of trial that the transaction fell within
the requirements of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The trial court made no
mention of the Act.
Beginning on the top of page 21, and continuing to the bottom of page 24 of his brief,
the plaintiff makes numerous factual allegations. These allegations refer to the "slinging all kinds
of mud, to get custody, etc. of the minor children, that was prevalent in the divorce," and "the
defendant had done dirt to the plaintiff."

These allegations refer to comments as to the length

of time that the plaintiff had certain rifles; the time that was expended negotiating a resolution
of the divorce; attorney's fees; and other issues. None of these allegations contain a reference
to the record. Applying the holding of Butler Crockett, it is the defendant's contention that none
of these factual allegations are to be considered true.
Given insufficient findings, the appellate court is not to guess the authority upon which
the lower court awarded attorney's fees.
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POINT 3. THE APPELLATE COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO CATALOGUE THE
AUTHORITY AVAILABLE TO THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD FEES AND
DETERMINE WHETHER THE AWARD WAS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS.
The trial court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees. The defendant
contends that this award of attorney's fees by the lower court was improper. In his brief, the
plaintiff counters that the lower court could have awarded the attorney's fees on the basis of
contempt, or on the issue of bad faith.
The defendant invokes the case of Butler Crockett & Wash v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P. 2d
225 (Utah 1995) for the proposition that, given insufficient findings, an appellate court will not
catalogue the various authority available to a lower court upon which to base an award of
attorney's fees, and then review the facts of the case to determine whether the trial court's award
of attorney's fees is legally sufficient under one or all of those options.

In Butler, one of the

plaintiffs had misrepresented his ownership of an interest in real property to the court. In its
amended findings, the lower court determined that the plaintiff misrepresented his interest in a
piece of real property. The lower court ordered this plaintiff to pay $10,000 to the defendants,
representing the attorney's fees the defendants incurred as a result of this misrepresentation.
On appeal, the plaintiff in Butler attacked the award of attorney's fees. Based on the
court's determination that the trial court's finding did not state the legal basis of the award, or
explain the effect of the misrepresentation, the award of attorney's fees was reversed and the
issue was remanded to the lower court.

8

Although it is undisputed that Walsh misrepresented to the court his ownership of
property above Roosevelt Trail, that undisputed fact, standing alone, is not
sufficient to warrant affirmance of the sanctions. The finding is insufficient in
two important respects: (I) it does not make clear and we cannot tell from our
reading of the record, upon what legal ground the sanctions are imposed (i.e. rule
11 or the district court's contempt powers); and (ii) it does not explain how the
misrepresentation affected either the court or defendants. Accordingly, it is
impossible for this court to determine whether the imposition of sanctions is
proper as a matter of law, and if the sanctions were imposed for a violation of rule
11, whether the district court abused its discretion in formulating the type and
amount of the sanction.
Id. at 232.
In the instant case, in Finding 16, the court did make a determination that the defendant
had negotiated in bad faith, and had violated the restraining order that the defendant had obtained.
While the defendant disputes the factual underpinnings of these findings, the defendant does
recognize that the trial court did make such a finding. Similarly, in Butler, the Court did not
dispute that the plaintiff had misrepresented his interest in property to the lower court. The Court
in Butler Crockett did not then undertake the task of categorizing the various authorities the lower
court could have utilized to impose sanctions, and then determine whether the award would have
been proper under one or more of the ways in which the lower court could have made the award.
Applying Butler Crockett to the instant case, the defendant argues that where the findings do not
state the authority under which the court made the award of attorney's fees, this Court cannot
make a determination as to the legal sufficiency and correctness and/or reasonableness of the
attorney's fee award.
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As was set forth above, in her brief the defendant recognizes that the lower court did
make a finding that the defendant had negotiated in bad faith, and that under § 78-27-56 Utah
Code Ann., the lower court could have authorized attorney's fees based on a finding of bad faith.
This Court is not obligated to guess whether the lower court did utilize the theory of § 78-27-56
if there is no finding to that effect, or whether the lower court utilized some other authority that
may have been available to it. Applying Butler to the instant case, the defendant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the lower court's award of attorney's fees.
Should this Court determine that the findings are legally sufficient to support the award
of attorney's fees, the defendant would point out that in his reply brief, the plaintiff has not
presented any evidence that undercuts the defendant's argument that the defendant could not have
acted in bad faith in transferring the property if she did not know what interest in real property
she had.
Beginning on page 27 of his brief, the plaintiff makes reference to the affidavit the
defendant submitted in response to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff
sets forth that in the affidavit, the defendant states that she has personal knowledge of the matters
set forth therein. The plaintiff argues that it was inconsistent for the defendant to defeat the
Motion for Summary Judgment for claiming to know all of the facts regarding ownership of the
properties, and then argue in trial and on appeal that she "was totally in the dark in this matter."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 28).
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The plaintiff fails to make any citation to the record indicating that the substance of the
defendant's affidavit submitted in response to the plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was related in any way to the lower court's decision. The plaintiff fails to cite any
portion of the record that indicates that the lower court based its ruling on the basis of a
supposedly-contrary affidavit. The plaintiff fails to cite any portion of the record that would
demonstrate that this affidavit was an issue before the court. Applying the Butler decision to the
instant case, as there is no citation to the record as to this affidavit; and as there is no citation to
the record for many of the statements that the plaintiff makes in the third section of his brief, the
defendant requests that the same should not be considered as factually correct.
Should the Court consider the affidavit of the defendant in response to the plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the defendant would ask the Court to consider that the
affidavit is not contrary to the testimony offered by the defendant at trial, or the arguments made
the defendant on appeal. In that affidavit, the defendant states her position that the parties do not
have a marital interest in the properties.

This contention is consistent not only with the

stipulation that was read at trial, but with the defendant's position in the instant action.
POINT 4. THE PLAINTIFF'S INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY. AS WELL AS
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. CONTRADICTS THE FINDING THAT NO
EVIDENCE CONTRADICTS THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY.
In Point 4 of her brief, the defendant questions Finding 12 of the lower court. This
finding states:
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There was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the testimony
given by the plaintiff regarding the parties' interest, and therefore the court finds
as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake to be
marital property awarded to the plaintiff in the subject Decree of Divorce.
In his brief, the plaintiff sets forth a portion of the court's ruling found at page 570 of the
transcript. That portion of the court's oral ruling is different than Finding 12, which was drafted
by the plaintiff. The portion of Finding 12 that the defendant takes issue with is that there was
no testimony or evidence that contradicted the plaintiffs testimony of how an interest in the
subject properties was acquired. The defendant demonstrated in her brief that the plaintiffs own
testimony contradicted itself, and was contradicted by documentary evidence as well. The portion
of the court's ruling set forth in the defendant's brief states there was no "contrary testimony
from the — from any other record owners of the property, be they Dianna Vincent or Perry
Vincent." (Transcript, p. 570). That is an accurate representation of what the court stated. That
is not what Finding 12 as written by the plaintiff states.
In his brief, the plaintiff argues that Finding 12, which states there was no testimony or
evidence that contradicted the plaintiff, is not erroneous as the plaintiff really did pay for all of
the subject properties. In his brief, the plaintiff then seeks to explain away the contradictory
evidence and testimony (set forth in the defendant's brief) that the deed to the 3.1 acre parcel was
to be conveyed when the property was paid for, and that the deed was conveyed in December of
1997 prior to the time that the plaintiff claims to have made any payment on the subject property.

12

On page 35 of his brief, the plaintiff sets forth factual allegations as to what he contends
occurred relative to that piece of property. This almost full-page of factual allegations is devoid
of any reference to the record. What is clear from the record is that there is a statement in
Finding 12 that there was no evidence to contradict the plaintiffs testimony. As is set forth in
the defendant's brief, it is clear from the record that there was evidence that contradicted the
plaintiffs testimony, including evidence that the 3.1 acres was to be conveyed after it was paid
for, and that the deed was transferred prior to the time the plaintiff claimed to have gained his
interest in the properties by making payments.
POINT 5. THE FINDINGS DO NOT EXPLAIN HOW OR WHY THE PARTIES
OBTAINED AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
The fifth argument of the defendant's brief on appeal is that the findings were insufficient
to demonstrate how and why the parties acquired a marital interest in the subject properties. The
plaintiff, on page 41 of his brief, argues that his clear and uncontro verted testimony could only
have lent to the possibility of the court making a finding on his behalf. This contention ignores
the plaintiffs own testimony that Perry Vincent paid the down payment on the 3.1 acre property;
(TT. p. 43, 11. 1-2); that the balance of the payments for the purchase of the 3.1 acre property
were made from Perry Vincent and his sand-blasting company (TT. transcript, p. 43, 11. 16-20);
the plaintiffs testimony that the corporation tendered the down payment on the 3.78 acre property
(TT. p. 15, 11. 12-24); and that Perry Vincent paid the taxes on the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 65,
11. 7-9).

The plaintiffs contention also ignores the defendant's testimony that it was her
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understanding that the two parcels were purchased by her father, Perry Vincent, who had asked
her to sign with her mother on the property (TT, pp. 28, 1. 17). This testimony, as well as the
documentary evidence which demonstrates that the 3.1 acre property was paid for prior to the
time the plaintiff claimed he started making payments on the property, raised a number of issues.
The holding in Butler Crockett requires that the findings contain "enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached." Id. at
231. It is the defendant's further contention that the bare, naked finding that there is a marital
interest, without findings as to the issues set forth immediately above is insufficient. It is the
defendant's contention that these issues raise eight (8) subsidiary issues. These eight subsidiary
issues and/or facts were set forth in the defendant's brief. For the sake of convenience, they are
set forth immediately below:
(a) whether the court found that there was a marital interest when
the properties were purchased, and if not, when the marital interest
was acquired; (b) whether the court found that Diane Vincent did
not have an interest, or if she did have an interest, when and how
that interest was lost; (c) whether Perry Vincent had an interest and
if so, when it was lost; (d) how was a marital interest acquired; was
the marital interest acquired through Shauna Costanzo, or was it
through David Costanzo; (e) were Diane Vincent and Shauna
Costanzo merely holding the properties in a constructive trust on
behalf of their husbands, or on behalf of David Costanzo; (f) if
David Costanzo acquired an ownership interest by virtue of
payments he made, what are the facts that led the court to grant
judgment based on the finding that the plaintiff had completely
owned both of the subject properties; (g) how the marital interest
was acquired - was it by way of gift through the defendant's father
or mother, or was it by virtue of payments that the plaintiff made;
(h) if the court accepts the testimony of plaintiff that ownership of
14

the properties was established through the payments he made, a
finding as to why ownership interest was not acquired by the
corporate entities rather than David Costanzo personally; (i) a
finding as to how the court determined that the defendant should
have judgment for the entirety of both properties, if, as the plaintiff
testified, that by virtue of payments he made, he had made one-half
of the payments for the properties.
As was set forth above, and as is set forth in the defendant's brief, it is contended that the
plaintiffs testimony was not clear, but in fact the plaintiff rebutted his own testimony. Further,
there is no explanation in the findings as to how the lower court resolved any of these ownership
issues, such as how one of the record owners, to-wit Dianna Vincent, was stripped of her interest
in the property; or whether Dianna Vincent never really had an interest; or if a corporation or
corporations made the payments, why the corporations do not have an interest in the properties.
A lack of specific findings on these issues make it difficult if not impossible for an appellate
court to determine how the lower court reached its ultimate determination that there was a marital
interest in the subject properties.
On page 38 of his brief, the plaintiff responds to the defendant's argument that if, as the
plaintiff contends, that his interest in the property was acquired by way of payments, and those
payments were made by corporate entities, that there should have been findings as to that effect.
The plaintiff contends that
...reference to which corporations paid what, is of no significance because the
corporations were wholly owned and operated by the parties, and whether the
check came from Mr. Costanzo [sic] personal account or from the account of
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Western States (wholly owned by the Costanzos) is immaterial and only
misleading and confusing to this Court.
(Appellee's Reply Brief, p. 38).
There are several problems with the plaintiffs contention and factual allegations. The
first problem is that there are no citations to the record as to the factual allegations that the
corporations were wholly owned and operated by the parties. The second problem with the
plaintiffs contention is that the law recognizes a corporation as having its "own legal identify
and existence." Institutional Laundry v. Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1995)
at 1067. The third problem with the plaintiffs contention is that the plaintiff seems to be arguing
that the corporation and/or corporations were alter-egos of the parties. It is possible that this
contention is correct. It is just as possible, given the absence of any testimony on the subject,
that the corporations were not alter-egos of the parties. In accordance with the decision in
Municipal Building Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1995)
For one corporate entity to be the alter ego of another, two requirements must be
met. First, "there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation[s]...no longer exist." ...Second, "the observance of
the corporate form [must] sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or [cause] an
inequitable result [to] follow, (citations omitted).
Id. at 278.
It may be that had there been some evidence on this issue, the court may have found that
the corporations in question were in fact the alter-egos of the parties. The record is devoid of
any such testimony. Further, there is nothing to suggest that the court found any corporation to
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be an alter-ego of the parties. It is respectfully submitted that in the absence of any finding how
a marital interest in the real property was acquired, when the plaintiff claims to have personally
acquired an interest in property by personally paying for the properties, and when it is undisputed
that the plaintiff did not make any payments, but that corporate entities made those payments,
and in the absence of any evidence that the corporations were alter-egos of the plaintiff or other
individuals, that the findings are insufficient.
DATED this

'///j

day of

. 1997.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Harry Casfcn
Attorneys rbf-Defendant/Appellant
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CONCLUSION
As the plaintiff did not allege, attempt to prove, or establish a change in circumstance;
and in that the court did not find a change in circumstance, the court's judgment granting the
plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be reversed. Should the court find that
the plaintiff did prove a change in circumstances sufficient for the lower court to grant the
plaintiffs Petition to Modify, the defendant respectfully requests that the court find that the
defendant has attacked clearly erroneous findings that are not supported by the evidence and
reverse the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 15th day of April, 1997.
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